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SUMMARY
This paper provides one of the ﬁrst assessments of the burden of both the public health
investigation and the economic costs associated with an apparent outbreak of Legionnaires’
disease (LD) in South East London. In addition to epidemiological, microbiological and
environmental investigations, we collected data on the staﬀ time and resources committed by the
11 main organizations responsible for managing the outbreak. Of the overall estimated costs of
£455856, only 14% (£64 264) was spent on investigation and control of the outbreak compared
with 86% (£391 592) spent on the hospital treatment of the patients. The time and money spent
on public health services in this investigation appear to represent good value for money
considering the potential costs of a major outbreak, including the high case-fatality rate in LD
generally and the high health-care costs. Further research is needed to determine optimum
strategies for the cost-eﬀective use of health system resources in investigations of LD. Whether
the threshold for investigation of cases should be based on observed incidence rates or the
cost-eﬀectiveness of investigations, or both, should be debated further.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the number of cases of Legionnaires’
disease (LD) detected in Europe has risen sharply
[1]. This has been attributed to a range of factors
including changes in diagnostic methods, improved
surveillance systems and the identiﬁcation of new
sources of infection [1, 2]. Most LD is community
acquired. Sources widely reported to be linked to
outbreaks include cooling towers [3–5], spa pools
and other aerosol-producing devices such as indoor
fountains and food display misters [6–8]. When out-
breaks do occur they can be large, dramatic and result
in considerable health-care costs [9, 10]. However,
most cases that are identiﬁed are isolated sporadic
cases where a source is never found. There is still little
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comparative information on the proportion of spor-
adic cases that acquire the disease from home, work,
hospital or other environments. Because of this lack
of information, and because every case could herald
a large outbreak, public health authorities carefully
investigate each new case of LD reported. The im-
perative is to identify any possible environmental
source that could put others at risk. However, the
costs and beneﬁts of this approach have rarely been
considered and there is currently no UK national
guidance on what the threshold should be in trigger-
ing investigations of clusters of LD.
This paper is one of the ﬁrst assessments of both
the public health investigation costs and economic
costs associated with investigating an apparent out-
break of LD. It also considers for debate whether
the investigation threshold used is still valid when the
incidence of isolated cases of LD continues to rise
across Europe.
METHODS
An apparent outbreak was detected following the
report of two cases of community-acquired LD to
the South East London Health Protection Unit
(SELHPU) on 17 July and 8 August 2005. A case
deﬁnition for the outbreak was deﬁned [using the
standard Health Protection Agency (HPA) case deﬁ-
nition] [11] as a person who had a clinical diagnosis
of pneumonia with microbiological evidence of infec-
tion with Legionella pneumophila and a geographical
association (having lived in or visited the South East
London area during the 10 days before onset of
illness) and became ill within the time period 10 July
to 30 August 2005. Detailed investigations were per-
formed in accordance with established national guid-
ance on investigation and control of LD [12–14].
Epidemiological investigations
All patients and/or their close contacts were inter-
viewed as soon as possible after a diagnosis was
conﬁrmed. We used standardized questionnaires to
collect information on current illness, place of resi-
dence, possible risk factors and movements in the
2 weeks before illness onset. Face-to-face interviews
were conducted in the hospital of treatment whenever
possible with the aim of gaining a detailed case his-
tory. Further interviews were conducted with other
close contacts or with the cases themselves using their
personal diaries or calendars where necessary to
clarify details of cases’ movements. This included
routes taken to and between home, workplaces,
shops, pubs and other locations, including any trips
out of South East London. The detailed travel his-
tories enabled staﬀ to map the movements of cases
down to road and postcode level where possible. As
each new conﬁrmed case was identiﬁed, case histories
were compared to look for possible epidemiological
associations. Cases were re-interviewed if new infor-
mation emerged from the investigation which re-
quired further checks linking them to a potential
common source.
Clinical case ascertainment
In England and Wales there is no statutory require-
ment to report LD but microbiologists and doctors
are requested to report conﬁrmed or probable cases
of LD to the local unit of the HPA. These are trans-
mitted promptly to the National Surveillance Scheme
for LD, coordinated by the HPA Centre for Infec-
tions (CFI). Active case searching was begun across
South East London National Health Service (NHS)
organizations. Letters about the increased incidence
of LD cases locally were sent to all general practi-
tioners, acute clinical and microbiology departments
in the six acute NHS hospitals and NHS Direct ser-
vices, alerting staﬀ to the symptoms of the disease and
reminding them to report any new cases immediately
to SELHPU.
Other cases reported within the United Kingdom
and across Europe were investigated for any contact
with the South East London area through communi-
cation with local health protection units across
England and Wales, and internationally through the
European Surveillance Scheme for Travel Associated
Legionnaires’ Disease (EWGLINET) [15]. This was
facilitated through the UK National Surveillance
Scheme.
A diagnosis of L. pneumophila infection was estab-
lished in the admitting hospitals using commercially
availableL. pneumophila urinary antigen kits. Labora-
tories were asked to submit all positive urine samples,
together with any available respiratory samples from
the respective patients, to the CFI. Urine samples
were examined in the CFI using an in-house enzyme-
linked immunoassay (EIA) speciﬁc for a subset (des-
ignated mAb2+ve) of L. pneumophila serogroup 1
strains [16]. Isolation of L. pneumophila was at-
tempted from respiratory samples using standard
techniques [17] and where successful isolates were
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characterized by monoclonal antibody subgrouping
[18] and DNA sequence-based typing (SBT) [19].
Culture-negative samples were further examined by
PCR using an in-house L. pneumophila mip speciﬁc
PCR with direct SBT being applied if they were
positive [20].
Environmental investigations
Environmental investigations were performed by
oﬃcers from ﬁve environmental health depart-
ments (Lewisham, Southwark, Bromley, Bexley and
Wandsworth), the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
and staﬀ from the CFI. Potential environmental
sources were identiﬁed by reviewing the patients’
movements in relation to the list of cooling towers
registered with the local authorities, and local
authority and HSE records of other known potential
sources, e.g. car washes, train washes, fountains,
spray cleaning devices, air scrubbers and irrigation
equipment. In addition unregistered cooling towers
and other potential sources were sought by the inves-
tigating oﬃcers walking the area and questioning
the occupiers of commercial premises as appropriate.
Letters were sent from local authorities to commercial
premises reminding them of their legal obligations
with reference to control and prevention of LD.
Samples were collected in containers containing
sodium thiosulphate in suﬃcient quantity to neutral-
ize any residual oxidizing biocide and sent for analysis
at the HPA London Regional Food, Water and
Environmental Services Laboratory (LFWEL) which
is accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation
Service (UKAS) to ISO 17025 for the examination of
water and environmental samples for the detection
of Legionella. For each possible source any identiﬁed
equipment or systemwas inspected visually, anymain-
tenance and microbiological test records reviewed
and microbiological samples collected. Domestic
premises, when possible, were sampled according to
HPA guidelines [21]. The microﬂora from the water
samples (1 litre) were concentrated by a combination
of ﬁltration and centrifugation [19] and used for the
detection of Legionella by culture methods following
ISO 11731 [22]. Internal quality controls were in-
cluded with each batch of samples processed.
Estimating the health costs of the outbreak
Information of the costs involved in carrying out the
investigation, control measures and management was
obtained from the organizations involved once the
outbreak was declared over. Each provided infor-
mation on direct costs including staﬀ resources dedi-
cated to the investigation (both in time spent and
actual payroll cost), travel costs, the costs of the
domestic and environmental sampling (including
laboratory costs, costs of transporting samples) and
clinical microbiology costs. This did not include the
costs of an organization’s overheads nor other indirect
costs incurred by the organizations. Estimates of
treatment costs for all cases were derived from the in-
formation provided by the local Primary Care Trust,
which is responsible for commissioning health care
in the area where the outbreak occurred. These are
estimates for the full costs of acute treatment including
medical care, bed days, investigations and medicines.
Other costs to patients themselves, their families or
their employers were not collected in this exercise.
RESULTS
Epidemiology
Between July and October 2005 14 cases of com-
munity-acquired LD were reported associated with
the South East London area. The epidemiological and
microbiological investigations were consistent with
a small initial cluster of six cases spread over about
6 weeks, followed by a second cluster with onset dates
between 27 and 30 August 2005 (Fig.).
All cases were males aged from 31 to 73 years
(mean 54 years). The backgrounds and lifestyles of
the cases were, however, very diﬀerent. Ten were
actively employed and four retired. Twelve were resi-
dents of South East London and two worked in the
area during the incubation period. Common areas
of overlap could only be established for up to seven
cases at any one time. Two cases had a history of
travel abroad, but the timings strongly suggested that
they acquired the disease locally.
The extensive investigation of case histories re-
vealed no shared risk factors, although all but one
were cigarette smokers. None of the cases had visited
the location of a known potential LD source which
was common to all other cases. The mapping per-
mitted identiﬁcation of areas where there had been
overlaps in their movements. At a later stage in the
investigation, staﬀ at the HPA Centre for Emergency
Preparedness and Response, Porton Down provided
assistance with transferring the manually mapped
case movements (and possible environmental source
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locations identiﬁed by the HSE and local environ-
mental health departments) onto digital maps using
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) technology.
The GIS allowed a 500 m buﬀer zone to be plotted
around case movements to highlight likely areas
where common sources might be located by rating the
cumulative risk of exposure for all cases on a scale
from high to low.
Clinical
All cases had pneumonia conﬁrmed by chest X-ray
and positive urinary antigen tests. Twelve patients
were admitted to three hospitals in South East
London, although the hospital nearest the outbreak
area received eight admissions. The other two cases
were admitted to hospitals outside the area in Wales
and Spain.
Duration of symptoms prior to admission varied
from 2 to 8 days and included ﬂu-like symptoms,
fever, productive cough and shortness of breath.
Seven patients presented with abdominal pain, vomit-
ing and diarrhoea, and two patients developed con-
fusion and slurred speech. Length of hospital stay
ranged from 5 to 117 days (median 9 days) and six
patients required treatment in intensive care. There
were no deaths, but three patients suﬀered serious
complications, one case remained in hospital for
nearly 4 months and two required renal dialysis.
Clinical microbiology
Urine samples from 12 of the patients were submitted
to the CFI. All were conﬁrmed as positive for
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 (mAb2+ve). Sputum
samples were obtained from nine patients and
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 was isolated from ﬁve
of these: all were determined to be mAb subgroup
‘Allentown’. A further two patients (cases 5 and 7)
were PCR positive for the L. pneumophila mip gene.
Typing of the ﬁve isolates showed that two isolates
were indistinguishable by phenotypic and genotypic
methods (cases 2 and 3). Epidemiology conﬁrmed that
these cases had visited one deﬁned location that
had not been visited by any other case; however, no
speciﬁc source was identiﬁed. Genotypic typing data
from cases 6, 10 and 12 showed that they had been
infected by three other strains. SBT was attempted
directly from the two PCR-positive sputa but failed
for case 7 and was only partially successful for case
5 yielding valid alleles for three of the six genes. This
partial SBT proﬁle indicated that case 5 was not
infected with the same strain as cases 10 or 12 (Fig.).
These data clearly showed that the 14 cases were
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Fig. Conﬁrmed cases of Legionnaires’ disease in South East London, July–September 2005.
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caused by at least four distinct strains of L. pneumo-
phila serogroup 1.
Environmental sampling and testing
During the investigation 176 environmental samples
were collected including those from domestic prem-
ises, cooling towers, bus, car and train washes and
fountains. These samples accounted for all the poten-
tial sources from commercial premises and from 11
of the 14 patients’ homes. Access was not available
to the remaining homes. The number of samples
collected from these domestic premises varied from 1
to 10. None of the potential environmental sources
or domestic premises was identiﬁed as positive for
L. pneumophila. One implicated cooling tower could
not be sampled for health and safety reasons as there
was no safe access. This tower was closed on 12
August 2005 and was unlikely to be a common source.
Precautionary control measures were also applied to
some of the potential sources where applicable.
Direct economic costs
Investigation, control and management of the out-
break mainly involved staﬀ from 11 organizations
or independent units of organizations: six local
authority environmental health departments, two
local health protection units, the HSE, one local
hospital microbiological laboratory, the HPA CFI
and the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and
Response, Porton Down. The response lasted over a
period from the end of July to October. Total time
spent on the investigation and control aspects of
the outbreak across all organizations was about
1608 person hours, at an estimated minimum cost of
£64 264 (E95844) (Table 1). Most of the estimated
staﬀ time allocated to this outbreak was fairly equally
Table 1. Estimated costs of the investigation, control and management of Legionnaires’ disease outbreak
in South East London (July–August 2005)
Hours Cost (£)
Epidemiological investigations
Environmental health departments (six local authorities) 180 6945
Health protection units (local public health) 537 12 788
Legionella section, Respiratory Diseases Department,
HPA Centre for Infections, Colindale
36 1183
HPA Food, Water and Environmental Microbiology
Laboratories, Centre for Infections, Colindale
26 1937
HPA Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Porton Down 45 2500
Sub-total 824 25 353
Environmental sampling
Environmental health departments 360 13 889
Health and Safety Executive 60 3645
HPA Food, Water and Environmental Microbiology
Laboratories
26 1937
Sub-total 446 19 471
Environmental testing
Staﬀ costs 254 5077
HPA Food, Water and Environmental Microbiology
Laboratories
26 1937
Consumables 3880
Transport of samples to laboratory 537
Sub-total 280 11 431
Clinical microbiology
Respiratory and Systemic Infection Laboratory,
HPA Centre for Infections, Colindale
58 5668
Sub-total 58 5668
Miscellaneous costs
Phone, post, stationary, travel — 2341
Total cost of outbreak investigation and management 1608 64 264
(yE94 780)
HPA, Health Protection Agency.
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divided between the epidemiological investigations
(50%) and the environmental sampling and testing
(45%); nevertheless the estimated total costs of
the environmental investigations were somewhat
higher than those for the epidemiological investi-
gations – 48% compared with 39%.
The estimated treatment cost incurred by the acute
hospitals for the 14 patients was £391 592 (E584 000).
Costs per patient ranged from £2184 to £201 648, with
a mean cost of £27 971 (median £4368) (Table 2).
DISCUSSION
Investigations in South East London over the summer
of 2005 identiﬁed 14 cases of LD clustered in time and
place. Whether they represented a single outbreak
or several clusters and sporadic cases was discussed
frequently during the incident. However, the investi-
gation and management were undertaken as if the
incident was an outbreak.
Microbiological typing subsequently showed that
the cases were caused by at least four distinct strains
of L. pneumophila serogroup 1, clearly excluding
the possibility of a single point or continuing source
outbreak. However the epidemiological and micro-
biological investigations were consistent with a small
cluster of cases early in the investigation, followed by
a second cluster with onset between 27 and 30 August
2005. Most of the ﬁrst six cases appear to have been
sporadic given the lack of distinct clustering in time
and place and the microbiological ﬁnding of a number
of distinguishable strains. The exceptions are cases
2 and 3, where the use of newly developed typing
methods enabled us to conﬁrm that these cases were
caused by strains of L. pneumophila that were indis-
tinguishable by phenotypic and genotypic methods.
This was strong evidence, when taken together with a
detailed history of common movements that these
cases were caused by exposure to a common source,
although none was identiﬁed. The later eight cases
(nos. 7–14) are more indicative of a point source out-
break, given the tight clustering in time and place. The
exception was case 12, which is most likely to be a
sporadic case given the distinct epidemiology and
typing data. Unfortunately, most of these later cases
were unable to produce sputum samples. Con-
sequently there was a lack of microbiological evidence
to conﬁrm a common Legionella strain. Despite the
lack of clinical samples in these later cases it should
be noted that overall a substantial proportion of cases
were culture proven and this enabled typing to be
undertaken to reﬁne the epidemiology. This success
was due largely to the good working relationships
between staﬀ in the organizations involved which led
to the prompt referral of respiratory samples from
urinary antigen-positive cases : in our experience
isolation rates exceed 50% where such samples are
available (T. Harrison, personal communication).
It is recognized that the active case ﬁnding under-
taken in this investigation may have increased ascer-
tainment in the area and identiﬁed cases that might
otherwise have remained undetected. However, the
14 cases of community-acquired disease in South
East London in 2005 compares with only two cases
reported from this area in 2004 [23].
Changes in clinical practice and diagnostic testing
(e.g. greater use of the urinary antigen detection test
in hospitals) may also account for some of the overall
rise in cases. A real increase in incidence may also
have occurred, as other European countries also re-
ported a greater than expected seasonal incidence of
community-acquired cases around the same time [2].
Since the large outbreak in North West England in
2002, the annual number of reported cases in England
and Wales rose from around 220 to over 300 per
year. About 25% of these cases were associated with
known clusters or outbreaks and almost 50% of
them associated with travel, either in the United
Kingdom or abroad [24]. Case-fatality rates have re-
mained stable over the past few years at 10–13% the
Table 2. Estimated treatment costs for all
conﬁrmed cases
Case no.
Length of
hospital
stay
Treated in
intensive
care Cost (£)
1 117 Yes 201 648
2 21 Yes 37 256
3 8 No 2184
4 26 Yes 35 064
5 6 No 2184
6 39 Yes 45 704
7 10 No 2184
8 8 No 4368
9 6 No 2184
10 13 No 4368
11 5 No 2184
12 29 Yes 36 936
13 8 No 2184
14 8 Yes 13 144
Total 6 39 1592
(yE578 000)
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exception being for healthcare-associated cases where
the fatality rate has been between 40% and 50%
(source http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/default.
htm). These data do not indicate that increased
ascertainment is solely accountable for the rise in re-
ports, as fatality rates would be expected to decline
if a greater number of less severely ill cases were being
detected.
The fact that no common source for some or many
of the cases was found does not necessarily mean
that one did not exist. National data suggest that a
common source was identiﬁed in only around 50%
of clusters/outbreaks that occurred in England and
Wales since 1980 (C. Joseph, personal communi-
cation). The prompt and exhaustive environmental
sampling undertaken is likely to have ensured that
all potential sources were identiﬁed, sampled and
controlled. However, the rapid action taken by local
authorities and the publicity around the outbreak
may have prompted local businesses in the area to
take precautionary or remedial action to ensure they
were in compliance with the UK codes of practice
[25]. This may have not only prevented further cases,
but also prevented isolation of legionellae from any
of the subsequent environmental water samples. In
any investigation there is always the conﬂict between
taking samples quickly before any remedial dosing
takes place, and protecting the public health from an
ongoing source by precautionary disinfection. When
an investigation is prolonged, it is inevitable that
some potential sources may only be identiﬁed after
remedial action has taken place.
Conﬁdence that the laboratory results were not
false negatives in this outbreak can be assured from
the rigorous internal controls. In addition, during
the outbreak period legionellae were isolated from
131/767 samples (17%) from a range of sites and
areas within the London and the Home Counties
not associated with the outbreak. The percentage of
positive samples (17%) was the same between August
and October 2006 (J. Lee, personal communication).
GIS was used to map all case movements, potential
sources and overlay a 500 m buﬀer zone around likely
areas of overlap. The use of GIS mapping occurred
rather late in the investigation and in this situation
it did not add much to the progress or outcomes as
existing data had already been mapped manually. GIS
could prove a useful tool in a bigger investigation
or if used from an earlier stage. Once electronically
mapped it is easier to update case and source infor-
mation and potential overlaps.
Costs of investigating clusters of LD
The estimated minimum cost of investigating and
managing this outbreak (including epidemiologi-
cal, clinical, microbiological and environmental
sampling) was £64 264 (E95844). Considerable staﬀ
time (1608 h) was provided at short notice by the
six local authority environmental health depart-
ments, the local South East London HPU, and staﬀ
from the HPA CFI Colindale. It should be recog-
nized that this is an underestimate of the true costs
to the organizations involved. Only the cost of
actual person-time committed to the investigation
was estimated, which did not include overhead or
indirect costs. In addition, there were opportunity
costs for all the organizations involved. Undertaking
work for the outbreak was at the expense of other
work that had to be delayed or covered by other
people.
Nevertheless, estimated costs of the outbreak
investigation were overshadowed by the enormous
costs of treating the 14 cases of LD at the hospitals of
admission. Of the overall costs of £455 856, only 14%
was spent on investigation and control of the out-
break compared with 86% on patient treatment.
The estimated treatment costs ranged from £2148
to £201 648 per patient (Table 2), with the mean
treatment cost being £27 971. The total treatment
costs were at least £391 592 (E584 000) and may have
been higher as only direct patient treatment costs
were estimated. Costs associated with enhanced case
ﬁnding, i.e. chest X-rays or urinary antigen testing in
all patients attending A&E with pneumonia-like
symptoms were not included. Eight cases were in-
patients in the same hospital, placing a dispro-
portionately high burden in terms of service pressure
and costs on one service provider. It was fortunate
that the patients who were particularly ill were ad-
mitted to several diﬀerent hospitals because demand
for beds (especially intensive care), staﬀ and other
resources did not result in further hospital ‘costs ’ be-
ing incurred (e.g. cancelling elective surgery or ﬁlling
intensive care facilities) as has happened in other
larger outbreaks of LD when most patients were
admitted to a single hospital [10].
There has been no follow-up study to estimate
the indirect social, health and economic costs to the
patients, their families and employers of the acute
illness or its long-term sequelae. It is probable that
these would be signiﬁcant. One follow-up study of
the health of 122 survivors of an outbreak of LD in
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The Netherlands showed that most reported impacts
on their health-related quality of life and 15% had
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder which
persisted for at least 1.5 years [26].
Costs of LD outbreak management have not been
published in detail before, although reference has
been made to the estimated extra hospital costs of
£5 million for diagnosis and treatment in a large UK
outbreak in 2002 [9]. Further studies of the economic
costs of LD outbreak investigations are needed. These
should include longer term follow-up of cases to
estimate the wider indirect costs to patients, their
families and health-care systems [26]. With such in-
formation it might be possible to create a cost model
that could be applied more widely to other outbreaks
and sporadic cases.
Conclusion: a threshold for investigation?
Should we treat every new case as if it is the start of
an outbreak or should we have an agreed threshold
for investigation of clusters of LD? It could be argued
that the continuing increase in incidence of LD across
Europe justiﬁes investigation of every case to deter-
mine whether cases are simply clustered in time or
linked to speciﬁc outbreaks. There is no UK national
guidance on what the threshold should be for trig-
gering investigations of clusters of LD. In England, as
a minimum standard every case should be subjected
to a 2-week exposure history and a check of major
risk factors. When cases are clustered in space or
time this warrants further investigation to exclude a
common source. The public health response to two
or more linked cases should ideally be managed
within the context of what is known locally about
the geographical and industrial landscape and popu-
lation density. There is currently no ‘right ’ answer to
this issue. For example two community-acquired
cases linked in time and place in a rural area would be
rare and should generate intensive investigations,
whereas two cases linked in time and place in a large
town or city are fairly common and may be due to
diﬀerent sources that may never be identiﬁed because
of the multiple opportunities for infection in this
setting.
As the number of community-acquired cases seems
to be increasing each year, particularly in urban set-
tings, this level of investigation will have serious
implications for the workload of health protection
agencies. The cost-eﬀectiveness of investigating all
clusters is likely to diminish in the long run. Resources
may be better used in ensuring eﬀective control
measures are rigorously applied to potential sources
of infection and that managers of these systems are
fully aware of their legal responsibilities for main-
taining Legionella risk-free systems. These measures
could be adopted in conjunction with good public
health practice such as the regular use of media pub-
licity to inform the local population about LD and
its aetiology.
Ascertainment of cases is rising each year, partly
driven by more testing for Legionella infection in
patients with pneumonia, greater use of the urinary
antigen detection method and more awareness of the
disease in the general population. In the absence of a
known or suspected point source outbreak, incidence
rates per million population per region could be used
to provide baseline incidence levels, beyond which
health protection units should consider a trigger for
more extensive investigations.
Improved knowledge of the cost-eﬀectiveness of
such investigations may better inform development
of future guidelines for the investigation and man-
agement of LD against this background of rising
incidence and health-care costs. Whether the
threshold for investigation should be developed in
relation to observed incidence rates, to the cost-
eﬀectiveness of investigations, or both should be de-
bated further.
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